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COMPTES RENDUS 
contemporain. Les questions philosophiques doivent 
être posées dans ce contexte, et si l'article de M. 
Gillet est excellent, on pourrait souhaiter que le rap-
port entre le langage et l'intentionnalité y soit traité 
plus à fond. Il semble que l'A. ait tout à fait raison 
d'affirmer au sujet de la communication: «For this 
to happen, the thinkers involved must have co-
referential access to the items about which those 
judgments are being made and thus the objects of 
intentional activity, are not just a matter of individual 
experience but also appear in the thoughts of others. 
This creates a sense of objectivity in which 1 adapt 
my judgments to something which is mutually acces-
sible to me and you and shape my judgments in terms 
of shared rules for description and categorisation» 
(p. 91), mais comment peut-on concilier cette 
approche de l'intentionnalité et de l'objectivité avec 
la conception du langage qui se limite à la caracté-
risation de son aspect social. Et encore, si j 'ai un 
accès intentionnel direct aux objets, comme tout 
autre, et qu'il s'agit là de la condition de possibilité 
de la communication linguistique, comment peut-on 
soutenir en même temps, avec Wittgenstein, que «la 
pensée est essentiellement l'activité d'opérer avec des 
signes»? La pensée n'est-elle pas intentionnelle? Il 
nous semble que dans la perspective philosophique 
qu'adopte M. Gillet, ces questions méritent d'être 
posées. 
Les trois articles suivants concernent respecti-
vement la Métaphore cerveau, où D. Lambert, B. 
Feltz et G. Thill tente de montrer que le cerveau 
comme objet d'étude est un objet métaphorique et 
que la reconnaissance de ce fait ouvre un espace pour 
la liberté; L'analyse de la cognition par la psycho-
logie cognitive de R. Kolinsky et J. Morais qui défen-
dent l'irréductibilité d'un niveau psychologique 
d'explication des activités mentales; et finalement 
Carnap, Fodor et le cognitivisme logique de B. De 
Gelder qui reproche à Fodor, à tort ou à raison, 
d'avoir suivi Carnap en faisant une distinction inac-
ceptable entre observation et théorie. 
La communication de P. Engel, Psychologie 
populaire et explications cognitives, concerne une 
question fondamentale et largement débattue relati-
vement aux types d'explication valide des phéno-
mènes cognitifs. Essentiellement, l'A. discute de 
l'opposition entre Fodor, plus sympathique aux types 
d'explication inspirés par la psychologie populaire, 
et Paul et Patricia Churchland qui rejettent ce type 
d'explication parce que, selon eux, l'esprit n'opère 
pas à partir de représentations symboliques. Engel 
soutiendra que la position de Dennett permet de 
résoudre cette fausse opposition. 
Le dernier article. Et si demain le cerveau... ? de 
I. Stengers, propose une critique de l'approche neu-
robiologique de l'esprit. Le point fort de cet article 
est de relancer le débat sur l'essence de la science. 
Qu'est-ce que la science? Voilà bien une question 
philosophique qui précède tout questionnement 
d'ordre scientifique. La communication de Stengers 
suggère encore que la voie critique de la compréhen-
sion du rapport des neurosciences à la philosophie 
dépend de la détermination des questions qui valent 
comme questions philosophiques. Quelles sont les 




Marcel CONCHE, Temps et destin. Coll. Perspec-
tives critiques. Paris, PUF, 1992, 213 pages. 
A book that is timely, deep, erudite and elegant should 
be spared the common indignity of a single, hurriedly 
remaindered edition. The Presses Universitaires de 
France therefore perform an important service in 
bringing out a second edition of Marcel Conche's 
Temps et destin. 
Here, buttressed and illuminated by decades of 
careful reading and critical reflection, is a sustained 
argument for a re-awakened sense of time as mo ira, 
an allotment, a lot, a portion, a fate. Professor 
Conche's masterful epitomes of the doctrines of time 
and fate of Heraclitus, Aristotle, the Stoics, Des-
cartes, Kant and Bergson are a practical lesson in 
how to write the history of philosophy. Incisive, ele-
gant, thorough, unpretentious. 
The essence of the argument is this: With the 
waning of Christianity in the West comes the oppor-
tunity, even the urgency, of re-assessing the nature 
of time. Historical time, with its familiar landmarks 
of wars, dynasties and human achievements, by 
which we measure our lives, is, of course, fully con-
tained in a more comprehensive biological time, of 
which our history is only a variant and a part. The 
latter in turn is situated in a still greater geological 
time. The end of this regress is the fundamental, the 
absolute time, the time of all times. That is what the 
author means by the time of fate (94). Its only meta-
physically recognizable characteristics are ekstasis 
(separation of intants) and succession. The idea of 
other times nested within it leaves an opening both 
for fate and for freedom. Things historically deter-
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mined — take, for example, the inexorable prolife-
ration of human rights legislation in recent years — 
are clearly not determined biologically. Similarly, a 
biologically regulated process, like embryonic deve-
lopment, is undirected from the point of view of 
geological time. Applying this reasoning then to 
absolute time, which alone is, for Conche, the time 
of fate, our historical lives may paradoxically be said 
to unfold in absolute freedom. Here Conche is critical 
of the Stoics, who, he thinks, adopted without suf-
ficient reflection, an oriental fatalism quite out of 
keeping with Greek Thought at its best. The weak-
ness of Stoic thinking is shown in their view that the 
future is absolutely and necessarily pre-determined 
in every detail. It thus becomes indistinguishable 
from the past, which leads in turn to the Stoic doc-
trine of eternal recurrence, the circularity of time 
(590-
Absolute time, paradoxically, and contrary to the 
Stoics, is, Conche holds, the foundation of our free-
dom. Yet it is also the basis of our fate. For by it we 
are essentially finite creatures, to whom only a por-
tion is measured, before whom, therefore, death 
always looms as an inevitable end. Our portion is 
finally to be understood as that term was formerly 
meant, namely, as synonymous with our fate. We are 
free beings within the allotment that falls between 
our birth and our death. 
Our birth is our nature, etymologically speaking. 
And our nature is our fate. "The place, the era, the 
date, ... my health, my aptitudes, my ethnicity, my 
nationality, my family circumstances are all deter-
mined in part or in whole at my birth" (81). At the 
far end, my impending death, whose time and place 
is not, according to Conche, worked out in advance, 
nevertheless shapes the life I live. I may either retreat 
into unauthentic denials of its reality or I must try to 
face my end with courage, and to look upon my life 
as a work (oeuvre), for which I assume responsibility 
(144, 150). 
It is not absolute time as such, but rather the 
finitude of our portion of it, which forces upon us 
the work of our lives, at the same time making that 
work of no account. So is conferred upon human 
lives a dimension of tragedy. Animals, living within 
time, are of course as impermanent as ourselves, but 
not fully mortal, and hence not tragic, since death 
can take away no more than their immediate present, 
which is likewise snatched from them by every pas-
sing instant. Conche would agree with Auden: 
Not one of them was capable of lying 
There was not one that knew that is was dying 
Or could have, with a rhythm or a rhyme, 
Assumed responsibility for time. 
True and tragic mortality is expressed not in ani-
mal, but in human lives, which hoard their past and 
gather their future in a bulging present. So burdened, 
they stagger a little down the way until death unloads 
them. The strong are those who affirm their respon-
sibility for life, even in the face of death's certain, 
but inscrutable advance (157). The strong confer 
upon their lives a tragic dignity. 
And yet for all its manifold excellences which can 
only be gestured at in this review, Conche's thought 
depends on a premise too slight to bear the substantial 
weight of his intelligence and learning. Repeatedly 
(16, 49, 85) the reader is assured that the purpose of 
the book is not, in the first instance, to arrive at the 
truth of things, but rather in a manner which the 
reviewer would describe as 'transcendental', to 
develop the thinking implicit in the 'entente de l'é-
poque'. The labour-saving advantages of such an 
approach are, of course, self-evident. It frees the 
author from the burden of stating in advance what 
this 'entente' amounts to, which would tax even his 
analytic and descriptive powers. But it also spares 
him the task of a critique of his own time, that deepest 
and most needed of philosophical efforts, by which 
alone the tyranny of fashion can be transcended. 
Such advantages are however purchased dearly. 
Can a critique of one's own day be fully separated 
from a critique of oneself, to the extent that one is a 
child of it? Parts of Conche's account of fate seem 
recognizably drawn from the preoccupations of our 
time — the talk of nature, ethnicity, authenticity. But 
some of it seems anti-consensus, for example, his 
mainly negative account of the body (112f). Are we 
to be lulled — was the author himself, perhaps lulled? 
— into accepting Conche's idiosyncratic thoughts as 
the inevitable deliverances of our age? And what 
respect do we owe even to these, except as they hold 
for all ages ? 
A narrower logical difficulty with Conche's posi-
tion can provide the foundation for these large phi-
losophical questions. Temps et destin is implicitly 
historicist. It is said to derive, not from the author's 
absolute quest for understanding, but rather from his 
attempt to articulate the "reply of our times which it 
is incumbent upon us to hear" (85). And yet the har-
won concept of history itself, here so evidently in 
play, is merely part of the collective oeuvre of man-
kind (129), which therefore is likewise allotted only 
a portion of time, and cannot serve as the vantage 
point from which absolute time may objectively be 
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observed. At the foundation of this study, and present 
like a shadow throughout it, is the Platonic-Christian 
view of time as an image of eternity, and of ourselves 
as redeemed from time, and able in part to compre-
hend it, through being in the image of God. 
The author repeatedly dismisses our Christian 
past, though never without reverence and sometimes 
with noticeable nostalgia. Had he chosen instead to 
wrestle with than angel he might have arrived at a 
defeat more impressive than his present victory. Not-
withstanding that, however, the reader of this history 
and exposition of fatalism will be not merely enlighte-
ned, but challenged. 
Graeme HUNTER 
University of Ottawa 
Gerald J. GALGAN, God and Subjectivity. New 
York, Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1990, 
296 pages. 
In this monograph Galgan attempts to recast the his-
tory of the idea of being, beginning with Aristotle's 
conception of substance as the object of "first phi-
losophy", through Anselm's notion of God as the 
metaphysical link between Aristotle and Descartes, 
to Feuerbach's inversion of this tendency. Galgan has 
undertaken an ambitious task. In fact, I must admit 
that Galgan, employing the combined resources of 
the historian's philatelic care for details and the meta-
physician's predilection for propositional precision, 
has convinced me of his superb mastery of his sub-
ject-matter. Galgan's study, written with concision 
and clarity, and argued compellingly, recounts the 
transformation of being as substance to being as sub-
ject. "More specifically, as a report on the history of 
the concept of being, God and Subjectivity is a reflec-
tion on what mediates between the ancient founding 
and modern refounding of first philosophy. In essence 
it is about St. Anselm as a metaphysician — his 
meditation on and dialogue in first philosophy" (xii). 
In founding first philosophy, Aristotle understood 
being to mean not an hypostatization, but rather as 
an occurrence which inheres in particular and indi-
vidual things as a principle for their determination. 
Being, in other words, is the nature of things. In 
contradistinction to Parmenides, for whom being and 
thinking were convertible, Aristotle, in Galgan's view, 
maintains that substance or being, although disclosed 
in human thought, "exists independently of man's 
faculty of thinking or even his desire to thing" (xii). 
This disparity between the existence of the "this" 
and the cognizing agent posed no problem for first 
philosophy since 'the other", or object of cognition, 
was simply given, there for apprehension or obser-
vation. The situation would change with Descartes. 
Accordingly, with the Cartesian refounding of 
first philosophy, the human subject understands itself 
not as a given of nature, i.e., determined by it, but 
rather as a possibility that can master or lord it over 
nature. "The actualization and positivity of what is 
by nature are superimposed by the negativity and 
potentiality of what is human and particular. The 
modern refounding places man between God and 
nothingness" (xiii). Galgan intimates that being must 
now be construed in terms of the finite subject as a 
«'//'with infinite aspirations. Here again, a disparity 
is discernible. This time, instead of establishing a 
distance between being and the noetic agent, Des-
cartes focuses on his conviction that the ego implied 
in the dictum Cogito ergo sum is not, essentially, a 
being of nature itself. Because the subject is under-
stood as being substantially apart, ontologically 
removed, from nature, Cartesian thought suggests 
that, or allows for, the subject to impose itself on 
nature in whatever manner it pleases. The result is 
usually the human domination of nature. 
Situated between Aristotle and Descartes is 
Anselm. "The midpoint in this history of the concept 
of being — equidistant, so to speak, from the ancient 
founding and the modern refounding of first philo-
sophy — is the presentation of being qua being as 
the actuality of a creative substance which transcends 
form as such — a supreme, supranatural, particular 
'something' or 'aliquid'" (xiii). 
At this junction Anselm distinguishes himself 
from Aristotle's immanentism, i.e., the insertion of 
deity into the world as its first substance. In so doing, 
Anselm posits a God that is so extreme, so utterly 
different from the natural order that such a supra-
substantial existent is held to be the means by which 
all beings exist. The radical difference between crea-
tor and creature which Anselm establishes, whereby 
the former is postulated as a "essence which exists 
in a certain unique manner of its own" (47). removes 
him from Aristotle's tightly-knit metaphysics and 
draws his somehow closer to Descartes's apparently 
open system. 
This God, construed as spirit, shares the 
thoughtsfulness or thought-imbued, noetic dynamics 
of the Aristotelian deity. It is, in brief, a supreme 
agent that is "eternally mindful of itself" (36). This 
means that Anselm's God regards itself eternally, and 
166 
